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Abstract
As World War I began in 1914 and European stock markets shuttered, foreign investors
turned to removing gold from the United States, sparking fears of bank runs and suspension
of convertibility. At the start of August 1914, the New York Clearing House Association
(NYCH) again authorized the issuance of clearinghouse loan certificates (CLCs), which could
be used by member banks as temporary interest-paying substitutes for money in the
settlement of clearing balances. The membership of the NYCH jointly guaranteed CLCs and
committed to accepting CLCs as payment during the Crisis of 1914. Unique to the Crisis of
1914, the US Treasury Department also played a significant role as a lender of last resort
during 1914 through the utilization of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act to issue emergency currency.
These two forms of liquidity provision helped to calm money markets and avoid a full-blown
panic. The launch of the Federal Reserve also helped calm markets, although it was not
operational during the acute phase of the crisis in August 1914. At peak issuance, NYCH
banks had $109 million in outstanding CLCs, with all retired by the end of November 1914.
This represented 5.5% of net deposits held by NYCH member banks, a sizable intervention.
Keywords: clearinghouse loan certificates, Crisis of 1914, emergency currency, New York
Clearing House Association, private lender of last resort, World War I

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management. The author would like to thank Margaret Jacobson for
her insightful comments on this article. Please note that any information contained in this study that may be
attributed to Margaret Jacobson reflects her personal views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors or the Federal Reserve System.
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Overview
As World War I spread in the summer of
1914, European stock exchanges closed and
European investors sold assets on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), swapping the
proceeds for gold (Sablik 2013; Silber 2008,
285). Since gold functioned as reserves for
banks, a sudden and significant withdrawal in
gold could spark fears of suspension and
unleash bank runs. On August 1, the New
York Clearing House Association (NYCH)
reported that member banks’ reserves had
fallen $44 million in the previous week and
were deficient by $17 million (OCC 1914). On
August 3, the NYCH authorized the issuance
of clearinghouse loan certificates (CLCs), as it
had done in previous crises.
Member banks of the NYCH—which allowed
trust companies starting in 1908 although
none would join until 1911—could use CLCs
as a temporary substitute for money when
settling clearing balances with other
members. This allowed members to defer
cash payment, which would have required
the costly liquidation of bank assets.
Membership in the NYCH required the
acceptance of CLCs as payment, punishable
by expulsion from the NYCH, which would be
a significant financial and credibility blow
(Jacobson and Tallman 2015). The
membership of the NYCH jointly guaranteed
CLCs, with potential costs divided among
member banks proportionately to their share
of capital (Gorton and Tallman 2018, 43).

Key Terms
Purpose: To provide temporary liquidity to member
banks of the NYCH and lessen their need to liquidate
assets to settle clearing balances
Launch Dates

Announcement and
issuance: August 3,
1914

Expiration Dates

Final issuance:
October 15, 1914
Final cancellation:
November 28, 1914

Legal Authority

Not applicable

Peak Outstanding

$109 million on
September 25, 1914

Participants

Members of the NYCH,
including trust
companies

Rate

6% on circulating CLCs

Collateral

Commercial paper,
bonds and other
securities, and collateral
loans

Loan Duration

Not applicable

Notable Features

Paired with AldrichVreeland emergency
currency

Outcomes

Panic subsided, and the
Federal Reserve System
began operating shortly
thereafter

At the program’s peak, member banks
deposited $158 million, consisting of
commercial paper, bonds and securities, and collateral loans, with the Loan Committee (OCC
1914). In return, the NYCH issued a total of $125 million in CLCs, with a peak outstanding at
$109 million on September 25, 1914 (OCC 1915). CLCs carried an interest rate of 6%, in line
with market pricing (OCC 1914). Eleven clearinghouses in other cities also issued CLCs,
according to a US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) survey (OCC 1915).
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As in previous crises, member banks retired CLCs quickly after the crisis period subsided. In
the words of New York Times financial editor Alexander Noyes (1916, 103), “[T]he clearinghouse loan certificates disappeared automatically, as they have always done when panic has
disappeared.” The final cancellation of CLCs occurred on November 28, 118 days after the
first issuance and 64 days after the peak outstanding in circulation (OCC 1915).
Unlike other NYCH uses of CLCs during the National Banking Era (1863-1913), the
intervention in the Crisis of 1914 involved another active lender of last resort, the US
Treasury Department. Under the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908, the Treasury Department
could authorize the issuance of additional national bank notes upon the receipt of eligible
collateral. In 1914, banks utilized $386 million in emergency currency with $145 million in
just New York City, outpacing the issuance of CLCs (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). See Fulmer
(2022a) for a case study on emergency currency.
Summary Evaluation
The financial crisis of 1914 began with an exogenous event, rather than stresses or bubbles
within the financial system. According to Jacobson and Tallman (2015), the issuance of CLCs
by the NYCH proved to be helpful in alleviating the stress in the summer and fall of 1914.
Specifically:
We argue that clearing house loan certificates in 1914 [played] a secondary, but still
consequential, role in forestalling financial panic . . . Clearing house loan certificates as a
liquidity provision were particularly important for state banks and trust companies that
did not have access to emergency currency.
Some criticism of CLCs focuses on their usage restrictions in comparison to the AldrichVreeland emergency currency. For example, O.M.W. Sprague (1915) states, “[CLCs] served a
useful purpose in this crisis, but fortunately the banks were not obliged to rely solely upon
that imperfect device.” CLCs did not grant member banks the ability to meet external
obligations such as depositor withdrawals, but rather to “defer cash settlements” with other
member banks (Sprague 1915). With the official introduction of the Federal Reserve during
the later stage of the Crisis of 1914, the need for a private lender of last resort such as the
NYCH began to disappear.
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Context: New York Clearing House 1914–1915
Total net deposits for New York City banks
$1.25 billion in 1914
$175.3 million in 1914
Capital of NYCH membership
$178.6 million in 1915
New York banks average reserves
25.37% million in 1914
61 in 1914
Number of members in the NYCH
61 in 1915
$89.8 billion in 1914
NYCH clearing transactions (annual)
$90.8 billion in 1915
Ratio of peak outstanding CLC issuance to net deposits
5.5%
of NYCH membership
Sources: OCC 1914; OCC 1915.

1244

United States

Fulmer

Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The NYCH authorized the issuance of CLCs, following the onset of the
First World War and the damaging gold outflows from the United States, to
prevent a further erosion of bank reserves.
As the First World War approached in 1914, European stock markets closed and investors
turned to the United States, and the New York Stock Exchange in particular, to provide
liquidity (Sablik 2013). These investors could liquidate their holdings rapidly and exchange
the dollars for gold, which had a fixed value under the gold standard (Silber 2007).
Depository institutions feared that outflows of gold, considered bank reserves, could spark
bank runs within the United States. Although many of the same bankers had lived through
the gold outflows of the Panic of 1907, the Crisis of 1914 would double that previous crisis
in magnitude of gold outflows (Silber 2008, 72). On August 1, the NYCH statement showed
that member banks’ reserves had fallen by almost $44 million in the previous week, with a
deficiency of $17 million (OCC 1914).
During previous crises in the National Banking Era, the NYCH typically issued clearinghouse
loan certificates to member banks as a form of temporary liquidity to settle clearing balances
in order to prevent a mass liquidation of call loans, which would have had deleterious knockon effects for the stock market. However, Sprague (1915) notes that this order reversed
during 1914. To halt the gold flows out of the country, Treasury Secretary William McAdoo
requested that the NYSE close on July 31; it did and remained closed for stock trading until
December 12 (Sablik 2013). As a result, member banks could not liquidate call loans on the
stock market to raise cash (Sprague 1915). Therefore, CLCs were an essential form of
alternative liquidity.
On August 2, Secretary McAdoo met with the NYCH membership and stated that the issuance
of CLCs by the NYCH was essential for maintaining the gold supply of the United States. The
next day, the NYCH voted to authorize the issuance of CLCs (NYT 1914c). Specifically, the
resolution stated that “every means should be adopted to protect the gold supply . . . and it
was, therefore, voted that at the present time the Clearing-House Association be placed upon
a certificate basis” (CFC 1914).
Although the Federal Reserve Act had been signed in 1913, the Federal Reserve System was
not operational at the time of the crisis outbreak at the start of August, with nominations to
the board held up in Congress. The full contingent of members on the Federal Reserve Board
was not sworn in until August 10, 1914, and the reserve banks did not open until November
(Silber 2008, 120). As a result, the New York Clearing House Association and the Department
of the Treasury had to take the initiative to support the banking sector. However, two Senateconfirmed members of the Federal Reserve Board joined McAdoo at the August 2 meeting
with bankers, although the New York Times article covering this meeting does not provide
further detail on their involvement at said meeting (NYT 1914b).
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2. Legal Authority: The NYCH could issue CLCs as a private institution as long as they
did not circulate outside its membership.
As a private institution, the NYCH had the ability to issue CLCs. However, it was legally
necessary for the CLCs to circulate only within the membership. If CLCs could be used outside
the NYCH, they risked becoming state bank notes, which bore a 10% tax as a legislative way
to eliminate their existence (Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
The NYCH issued CLCs in multiple other crises throughout the National Banking Era for half
a century without any significant legal questions from the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency. This precedent formed essentially an implicit approval of the practice, as the OCC
dedicated entire sections of its annual report to detailing the issuance of CLCs in crisis
periods, without mentioning that they were an illicit action. See Fulmer (2022c) for a
detailed overview of the NYCH.
3. Part of a Package: The Department of the Treasury issued $386 million in AldrichVreeland emergency currency, which some members of the NYCH could access; as
in previous crises, the NYCH suppressed information about individual bank
balance sheets.
After the Panic of 1907, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908, which allowed
the Treasury Department to issue up to $500 million in “emergency currency” to national
banks as a lender of last resort (Sablik 2013). In addition to US bonds, national banks could,
if approved by the Treasury secretary during an emergency, deposit privately issued
securities with national currency associations and receive national bank notes in return,
increasing their cash supply (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). National banks typically
requested both emergency currency and CLCs, depending on their membership status in the
Federal Reserve System and the NYCH. Though all depository institutions could join the
Federal Reserve System, many state banks and trust companies refused to join due to its
associated costs and therefore had access only to CLCs. In total, about $386 million in
emergency currency was issued in the United States, with $145 million in New York City
alone (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). While a contemporary newspaper reported that the
NYCH allowed emergency currency to be used in clearing balances, Jacobson and Tallman
(2015) cast doubt on this claim in practice and state that emergency currency was not used
to settle clearing balances (CFC 1914).3 See Fulmer (2022a) for a separate case study
analyzing the Aldrich-Vreeland notes.
Interestingly, some members of the Clearing House Committee, an executive standing
committee of the NYCH, also served on the Executive Committee of the New York national
currency association, which issued the emergency currency previously discussed.
Furthermore, the meetings of both committees took place in adjoining rooms, seemingly at
the NYCH. This required these bankers to divide their time between CLC and emergency
currency issuance deliberations, which implies a possibly high level of coordination (NYT
The NYCH never allowed national bank notes to be used to settle clearing balances. Emergency currency was
national bank notes with a looser collateral policy, which Jacobson and Tallman (2015) believe implies that the
NYCH would not have accepted emergency currency.
3
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1914c). Since this was the first usage of emergency currency, it likely required more
intensive administrative work to issue emergency currency than CLCs, which had become a
common crisis tool for the NYCH.
The nascent Federal Reserve also worked to alleviate the pressure on banks’ reserves, albeit
not until after the acute phase of the crisis occurred in August 1914. It organized a pool of
banks across the country to buy $108 million worth of gold in September, allotting the
resulting contributions to each clearinghouse district, and a $135 million cotton pool in
October (Fed 1915a; Sprague 1915). Also, a provision in the Federal Reserve Act that took
effect on November 16, on the establishment of the reserve banks, lowered member banks’
reserve requirements. The change in reserve requirements released “a very considerable
amount of funds which had previously had to be held idle by the banks in order to bring or
keep themselves within the requirements of the law,” according to the Fed’s first annual
report (Fed 1915a). Sprague (1915) says that the Federal Reserve’s actions were “the most
promising indications of the service which may be expected from the federal reserve banking
system in future emergencies.” It seems likely that CLCs and emergency currency served to
prevent bank runs, while the Federal Reserve’s early programs focused instead on restoring
normal market conditions.
As in previous crises, the NYCH suppressed the release of individual bank balance sheets to
disincentivize bank runs against weaker member banks. This lasted from August 1, 1914, to
December 5, 1914 (Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
4. Management: The NYCH appointed a Loan Committee to manage the issuance of
CLCs and the deposited collateral.
The NYCH executive committee met all day on August 2 and scheduled a vote for the next
day to authorize the issuance of CLCs (Silber 2008, 73). The NYCH appointed a Loan
Committee of five bankers that assessed the value of collateral deposited with the NYCH in
exchange for the issuance of CLCs (NYT 1914c). This committee met and issued CLCs on a
daily basis.
5. Administration: The Loan Committee issued CLCs, and member banks were
required to accept them as temporary payment for settling clearing balances.
Member banks of the NYCH could request the issuance of CLCs from the Loan Committee
dependent on their deposits of eligible collateral. Other member banks were required to
accept CLCs as a temporary substitute for specie and legal tender payment for settling
clearing balances between members. Refusing to accept a CLC could result in expulsion from
the NCYH, which would have had significant consequences for the offending bank. Although
CLCs could be used only to settle clearing balances, this freed up other funds for continued
lending and limited the banks’ need to liquidate assets (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). See
Fulmer (2022c) for a deeper discussion of NYCH administration of CLCs.
When the NYCH issued CLCs to member banks, they were not charged an interest rate until
they presented the CLCs to another member as substitute for payment. Therefore, member
banks could borrow CLCs as a preventative measure and retire them if never needed, and
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thus avoid incurring the interest rate. During 1914, member banks circulated about 88% of
the total NYCH-issued CLCs, implying that many member banks did use their issued CLCs.
Jacobson and Tallman (2015) note that there is no information on how long these CLCs
circulated, which could have been a matter of days rather than weeks. During the first day of
issuance, a news report cited that the clearing balances (about $21 million) were “largely
paid in certificates,” although a “considerable part also was settled by the usual means” (NYT
1914c).
Notably, the NYCH’s previous experience providing CLCs during crises is positively
mentioned in the news media in the first days of the crisis. On August 4 (the day after World
War I erupted), a news report stated that the response of the NYCH to the crisis at hand vastly
outpaced that of the Treasury Department. Specifically, the process of issuing CLCs “had
become familiar to the bankers in [the Panic of] 1907” (NYT 1914c). As a result, member
banks were already using CLCs on the first day of authorization for settling clearing balances,
while the emergency currency had not been issued yet. This indicates a positive benefit to
the institutional crisis-fighting knowledge and experience held by the NYCH. Furthermore,
the New York Times explicitly made the comparison between the NYCH’s prompt action and
the Treasury Department’s slower rollout of relief through emergency currency (NYT
1914c).
6. Eligible Participants: Only the membership of the NYCH could access CLCs, which
included national banks, state banks, and trust companies.
The NYCH issued CLCs only to the 61 member banks during the Crisis of 1914 (OCC 1915).
These member banks included national banks, state banks, and trust companies (Jacobson
and Tallman 2015). Although the NYCH allowed trust companies to join the membership in
1908, no trust companies were members in the NYCH until 1911 (Cannon 1910; Sprague
1915). If CLCs were issued or used outside the membership, they could qualify as state bank
notes, which were penalized by a 10% tax (Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
Of the membership, 44 of the 61, or 72%, of the member banks requested CLCs (OCC 1915).
National banks took out 60% of the CLCs issued in 1914, trust companies took out under
30%, and state banks received only 10% of the issuance (Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
When the crisis began, Congress passed an amendment to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act that
allowed state banks and trust companies access to the emergency currency that national
banks could utilize as an additional liquidity source. However, this amendment required
state banks and trust companies to join the Federal Reserve System, which carried
significant costs (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). Many of these institutions turned down
joining the Federal Reserve System, and CLCs became their only possible source of liquidity
provision (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). Only 17 trust companies and state banks joined the
Federal Reserve System by May 1915, compared to 7,605 national banks (Fed 1915b).
7. Funding Source: The NYCH membership jointly guaranteed the payment of CLCs.
The entire membership of the NYCH funded the issuance of CLCs. If a borrowing bank failed
to pay back its CLCs, the membership of the NYCH assumed the cost, proportionately to the
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individual bank’s share of capital (Gorton and Tallman 2018, 43). Therefore, CLCs were
jointly guaranteed by the NYCH. See the Fulmer (2022c) for a more detailed discussion of
CLCs and their conditions.
8. Program Size: The NYCH issued about $125 million in CLCs in total, which equated
to about 6% of the membership’s net deposits.
The NYCH did not announce or predetermine an overall CLC issuance size when approving
the action, unlike in previous crises such as the Panic of 1873 (Fulmer 2022b). In total, the
NYCH issued almost $125 million in CLCs during the Crisis of 1914, with a peak outstanding
of $109 million on September 25. This peak translated to 5.5% of total net deposits of
clearinghouse member banks at the time. See Figure 1 for more scale comparisons of CLC
issuance. All these comparisons are lesser than the NYCH’s response to the Panic of 1907,
likely as a result of the existence of the emergency currency as an alternative source of
liquidity (OCC 1915).4
Figure 1: Comparison of CLC Issuance to Total Net Deposits, and Capital and Net Profits
Compared with peak outstanding CLCs
Percent of total net
deposits of member banks
Percent of capital and net
profits

5.5%
22.9%

Source: OCC 1915.

The NYCH issued 3,128 CLCs during 1914, ranging in denominations from $5,000 to
$100,000 (OCC 1915). See Figure 2 for a full breakdown of issuances during 1914.
Figure 2: Breakdown of CLC Issuance by Denomination
Denomination
Total issued
Aggregate value
$100,000
605
$60,500,000
$50,000
734
$36,700,000
$20,000
971
$19,420,000
$10,000
797
$7,970,000
$5,000
21
$105,000
Total

$124,695,000

Source: OCC 1915.

4

See Runkel (2022) for a Panic of 1907 case study.
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9. Individual Participation Limits: It is unlikely that the NYCH implemented
individual participation limits beyond member banks’ eligible collateral.
No documents suggest that the NYCH limited individual levels of borrowing beyond member
banks’ eligible collateral.
10. Rate Charged: The NYCH set an interest rate of 6%, which was in line with market
rates but much higher than the 3% charged initially on emergency currency.
Borrowing member banks paid an interest rate of 6% on accepted CLCs. Over the crisis,
borrowing banks paid almost $1.5 million in interest (OCC 1915).
In August and September 1914 while the stock exchange was closed, call loans ranged from
6% to 8%, with an average between 6% and 6.125%. However, the OCC noted that some
banks in New York charged rates as high as 10% during these two months at the height of
the crisis. As for commercial paper, rates ranged from 5.5% to 8%, depending on the quality
and length of maturity (OCC 1914). This would seem to indicate that the 6% rate charged on
CLCs did not function as a penalty rate but was rather in line with market prices. See Figure
3 for a visualization of market rates during the Crisis of 1914.
On the other hand, the rate charged on Aldrich-Vreeland notes was only 3% for the first three
months before rising to 6%. Theoretically, this disparity in interest rates should have led
banks eligible for both CLCs and emergency currency to only borrow in emergency currency,
since both could be used to settle clearing balances (CFC 1914; Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
However, research by Jacobson and Tallman (2015) determined that national banks in the
NYCH took out significant amounts of both CLCs and emergency currency, which would
indicate that there were certain benefits to borrowing CLCs that outweighed their higher
cost. Additionally, it was not the case that national banks borrowed up to their limit in
emergency currency, before turning to CLCs as a last resort. See Fulmer (2022a) for a study
of emergency currency during 1914.
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Figure 3: Range of Monthly Market Rates for Money in New York City throughout 1914

Note: Shaded gray column represents the period in which the NYCH issued CLCs. The dotted horizontal line
shows the 6% rate charged on CLCs.
Source: Author’s creation (OCC 1914; OCC 1915).

11. Eligible Collateral: The NYCH accepted commercial paper, bonds and other
securities, and collateral loans as eligible collateral.
According to the resolution authorizing the NYCH to issue CLCs during the Crisis of 1914,
member banks could deposit “bills receivable and other securities to be approved of by the
[NYCH Loan Committee]” (OCC 1915). Additionally, the resolution states that the collateral
deposited at the NYCH should receive a haircut of at least 25%. The NYCH had a general rule
of implementing smaller haircuts on Treasuries and government bonds, but Jacobson and
Tallman (2015) state that these assets were rarely used as collateral for CLCs. The Loan
Committee had the ability to ask borrowing banks to substitute their collateral if it was
maturing or insufficient for their CLC request (Gorton and Tallman 2018, 44).
New York banks deposited about $462 million in total collateral, with the peak amount
deposited closer to $158 million. Of this total, the collateral breakdown was 50.7% ($234
million) in “commercial paper,” 35.5% ($164 million) in “bonds and securities,” and 13.8%
($64 million) in “collateral loans” (OCC 1914). At the peak of outstanding CLCs ($109
million), member banks had deposited $158 million in collateral, implying an overall haircut
of 31% (OCC 1915).
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12. Loan Duration: It is unclear if CLCs contained a set maturity or term.
According to Cannon (1910), borrowing banks retired their CLCs as soon as they were able
to settle their clearing balances without the need for CLCs. Since the CLC operations
conducted by the NYCH were mutually approved, it seems that there was no need to set a
maturity for them. However, Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) mention that, in general, CLCs
contained a “fixed maturity of, typically, one to three months.”
13. Other Conditions: CLCs could be used only within the NYCH membership to settle
clearing balances.
As in previous crises, CLCs could be used by member banks only to settle clearing balances
with other member banks. They could not circulate outside the membership or serve as a
general substitute for cash payments (Jacobson and Tallman 2015).
14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: Although the NYCH was a private
institution that reallocated liquidity amongst its members, the combination of
CLCs and emergency currency effectively resulted in a money supply increase.
Jacobson and Tallman (2015) demonstrate that, in previous crises, the issuance of CLCs
failed to increase the money supply. However, the combination of emergency currency and
CLCs managed to create a “composite good that was a more complete substitute for legal
tender money” (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). As a result, the NYCH’s actions during the
Crisis of 1914 likely resulted in an expansion of the money supply. Although each form of
payment is an imperfect substitute for legal tender, it appears that the combination of the
two served a complementary purpose and allowed the money supply to grow despite the
lack of a central bank and the presence of the gold standard.
15. Other Options: The NYCH did not utilize reserve pooling, a tool last used in the
Panic of 1873; individual direct loans, as in 1907; or widespread suspension of
convertibility.
During the Panic of 1873, the NYCH implemented reserve pooling, transforming individual
bank reserves into a collective pool (Fulmer 2022b). However, the NYCH did not implement
this option for crises after the Panic of 1873. Previously, in 1907, the NYCH approved
individual direct loans to three member banks to stabilize them prior to the issuance of CLCs.
While these loans helped the individual banks recover from the crisis, they did not seem to
have a wider effect on the market (Runkel 2022). Research did not uncover any individual
loans to member banks in 1914.
Although it did so in previous crises, the NYCH seemingly did not implement any widespread
form of suspension of convertibility in 1914 (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). That is, as a
whole, the membership did not actively restrict withdrawals by depositors in New York City.
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16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: Other clearinghouses in the United States
issued $87.1 million in CLCs during the Crisis of 1914.
In total, 12 clearinghouses in the United States out of the 100 contacted by the OCC issued
CLCs during 1914. These clearinghouses issued in aggregate about $212 million in CLCs, with
a peak outstanding of $196 million (OCC 1915). Therefore, the NYCH issued 58%, or $124.7
million, of the total CLCs provided by clearinghouses during the Crisis of 1914. According to
the Fed’s first annual report, country banks (those outside New York City) hoarded cash,
which limited the ability to respond to the crisis (Fed 1915a). As a result, it is likely that
liquidity was tighter outside New York City.
17. Communication: The NYCH publicized its authorization of CLC issuance in
newspapers.
Because the authorization of CLCs was a measure intended to forestall depositor runs by
projecting confidence and action, the NYCH publicized its decision to issue CLCs during
crises. Although the front pages of the newspapers were occupied by declarations of war, the
first non-war-related articles typically covered the temporary liquidity measures of the
NYCH and the Treasury Department (NYT 1914a; NYT 1914b; NYT 1914c; NYT 1914d).
18. Disclosure: The NYCH did not publish individual bank usage of CLCs or member
bank balance sheets during the Crisis of 1914, to protect its weaker members.
During banking panics, the NYCH customarily suspended the weekly publication of
individual member bank balance sheets, so as to not expose weaker member banks to
depositor runs. The NYCH reported only data aggregated among all NYCH members from
August 1 to December 5 (Jacobson and Tallman 2015). Although the NYCH publicized its
authorization of CLC issuance, the New York Times specifically noted that the NYCH refused
to announce the issuance amount on the first date (NYT 1914c). It is unclear if the NYCH later
published aggregate amounts of CLC issuance.
19. Stigma Strategy: The NYCH likely did not need a stigma strategy for CLCs as their
issuance was a mutually agreed upon strategy with no public disclosure of
individual participation.
Because the issuance of CLCs was mutually agreed upon by the entire membership of the
NYCH and individual usage was not published, it would be highly unlikely that the borrowing
of CLCs would face serious stigma concerns. Member banks borrowed and circulated CLCs
in large quantities, probably due to the fact that it was their choice to authorize the program.
20. Exit Strategy: The NYCH had a procedure by which member banks could retire
their CLCs, which wrapped up on November 28, 1914.
Cannon (1910) provides a general overview of how the CLC cancellation process occurred
prior to the Crisis of 1914. It is likely that the same process was followed in 1914. First,
borrowing banks informed the Loan Committee of the NYCH that they wished to cancel some
of their CLCs. The Loan Committee then informed the lending banks of this intention to retire
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the CLCs and set a specified date at which interest would stop accumulating. The lending
banks sent the CLCs back to the Loan Committee for redemption, and the Loan Committee
released the deposited collateral back to the borrowing banks (Cannon 1910).
The NYCH canceled the first and last CLCs on August 26 and November 28, 1914,
respectively. One hundred eighteen days passed in between the NYCH’s first issuance and
the final cancellation (OCC 1915). The New York Stock Exchange reopened for limited bond
trading on November 28 and stock trading on December 12 (Sprague 1915).
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